Portugal's Africa Wars As Told By Some (1961-1974)
A Review Essay by Mustafah Dhada, FRSA, D. Phil (Oxon).
School of International Affairs and Development
Clark Atlanta University
Introduction:
I don't know how is it for you, but I am a biblioleptic hedonist. For me, reading and reviewing a book is a total experience of the senses. The feel and size of the book - grabability factors - the type style, size, kerning strategies, and header accents, the paper color and weight, and graphics layout of cover, illustrations, photographs, maps, and lists of contents, matter. They are on occasions as important as the text, its readability, and the scholarly treatment of the subject under review. Survey of the literature in the field to treatment of evidence, awareness of scholarly research already in place, and contribution to knowledge in the field - all these things and more - are important too, of course!
However, nothing beats a sensuous mental curl up. Imagine, one arm akimbo with coffee in hand! The remainder of the corpus mentis nestled in a nook on a doughy couch, with clumps of cushions rump-tucked so to speak. Add to that a guilt-ridden intensity as you play truant from an academic committee meeting or two, away from the maddening crowd with a good read. Ah! Bliss, sensuous unadulterated bliss! You know the sort of book that does several things: make Edward Tufte1 jump out of his graphics-intensive skin (metaphorically speaking of course), bring George Orwell2 back from the rhetorical dead, catapult Edward Gibbon to swirling alliteration with a light-headed quill3, and propel C.R. Boxer4 to nod approvingly once or twice - and with grace. That sort of book tends to leave the rest of the book- world sleepy. But it wakes up a soul or two amongst the be-gowned ensconced in windowless ivory towers. The sort of book that brings you within the ear-short of a tut-tut between scholar- maharajahs; one highlighting the omission of this; the other puzzling over the exclusion of that; but both agreeing though that inclusions of such and such works was at best marginal and at worse unworthy of an eleven pitch Times Roman typeface.
For that type of a good read, I am prepared to forgive occasional aberrations of writing style. I am prepared even to overlook lapses in methodical research - to a point though I dare add. Yes, I am willing to take in stride hints of reductionism in reasoning, typos, misquotes, poorly constructed indexes, insipid tables of contents, and more tipos (sic). For this and sensuously more, I will give up many things: obtuse monographs masquerading as cutting edge research or texts dense beyond discomfort or clam-shut too tight to yield to pleasures of thought-provoking reads after several passes. In other words, nothing beats what I describe here - a treat of the total senses. Give me a good book any day. Hell, I am even prepared to settle for a read with reasonably good bits in it - and José Freire Antunes' two volume work here on Portugal's African Wars proves to be just that.
Opera Antunea
José who? Y, you might well ask.? In the last eighteen years he has built a career as Portugal's most readable, reasonably popular, and highly thought-provoking writer. Antunes is driven, passionate and prolific. Single minded, his published works investigate uncharted territories on occasions. Mostly though they focus on four areas critical to Portugal's contemporary history, politics and society: Portugal's African Wars during the decade of the sixties and early seventies; Portuguese diplomacy; Portuguese armed forces and its intrusive role in national and imperial politics since the turn of the century; biographies of corporatist ideologues, Erastian Catholics, and protectionist economic nationalists whose reign was brought to an unceremonious end during the bloodless April Revolution of the Carnations.
To date, Antunes has penned with resounding success fourteen published monographs and smaller works inclusive of articles - clocking on average a book every fifteen-and-a-half months, or to put it in another way, nearly five hundred polished and published words a day. Phew! Four of these volumes were crafted during a five year tenure as a Gulbenkian-sponsored research associate at Columbia University. It was here that he came under the influence of Columbia's oral history unit. One of the world's oldest if not the oldest unit of its kind, Columbia's unit was and still remains entirely devoted to two things: developing sophisticated methodologies in the collection, documentation, cataloguing, and analysis of biographies and allied material; and crafting a strategy for validating oral history as a legitimate discourse in mainstream historiography.5
From here at Columbia Antunes charted a new approach to his written output. After 1987, he moved the focus of his works away from ideas, structures, and processes as he had done heretofore when examining ideologies underpinning Portuguese colonization and decolonization, and the role of the Portuguese army in Portuguese domestic politics.6 He chose instead to hone in on biographic, personal, conflict and mediation oriented materials, and materials expressing opposing viewpoints to explain analytical propellants driving Portugal's domestic politics, diplomacy, and imperial policies in Africa.
Hence, three of the works written during this five year period at Columbia were predictably biographical. The first volume in this cluster of books, records the meteoric rise of the politician Sá Carneiro during the seventies.7 The next two volumes are an edited collection of letters culled from Caetano's personal archives in the hands of his children who are now back in Portugal.8 As readers may recall Caetano had gone into exile in Brazil once his regime was toppled by the Portuguese military headed by Field Marshal Ant_io Spinola, who was then universally acclaimed as a charismatic figure and is still seen today as a highly effective commander of the Portuguese Army during his reign in Guinea that began in May 1968.
Antunes' fourth volume of this period made selected use of diplomatic sources in the United States. It outlined five years of Luso-American relations under Nixon.9 This is a theme to which Antunes returned four years later in two additional volumes. The first of these examined Portuguese American relations as a proto-biographical dialogue between Nixon and Caetano. The monograph was crafted against a complex backdrop of imperatives driving the national interest between the two nations on either side of the Atlantic pond. Nixon was then pitted as president of a potent power incapacitated by Watergate. Caetano on the other hand was projected as premier of a Lusitanian state, empire in hand, rich in territorial and natural resources but unable to seduce Nixon entirely with gifts of strategic morsels. One such morsel was the use of the Azores under NATO in return for a firm military, diplomatic and moral backing of Portugal's wars and colonial stay in Luso-Africa.
The second book on this theme of bilateral diplomacy examined Luso-American relations during the Kennedy administration. It was essentially a character study of two leaders. One, Kennedy, was bold, young, engaged and willing to go where no President had gone before. The other was Salazar, a wily coyote, sharp, convulsively cautious but unlike Caetano, willing and agile enough to be able to strike at a moment's notice should the occasion merit such a move.10
With the above volumes we witness an end to this theme on bilateral diplomacy in Antunes' work. What follows then is a quartet started in 1992, one year after his study of Kennedy and Salazar in the Lion and the Fox. The first two works in this cluster are heavily biographical. In the first work Antunes shows some sensitivity in handling and editing confidential letters written between Caetano and Salazar during a thirty six year period.11 These letters expose Salazar as an obtuse sophist crafting pre-emptive strategies in musty academic solitude. Antunes' awareness, albeit uneven, of methodological issues governing oral historiography serves him well here. On occasions, we see him edit with a minimalist quill this collection of letters between patricians professing privately, public virtues of corporatism as ideology and corporatism as governance.
Antunes manifests, alas only sporadically, a similar awareness of the fragile and deceptive nature of oral materials when he sets himself to tackle his next subject - Jorge Jardim, Salazar's eminence grise in Africa. Jardim was a rabid developmental corporatist,12 a wealthy cement dealer. He was deeply entrenched in Mozambican settler politics and pitched for Salazar to further his vision for a Euro-Africa in the south with neighboring states of Zambia, Ian Smith's Rhodesia, apartheid-ridden South Africa, and Malawi. He was to find in Malawi's Kamuzu Banda a kindred spirit, a model of exactly what he believed possible for Portugal's Africa - Lisbon-tailored blacks, etiolated of nativity justly deserving Cam_s and perhaps more tangibly, a dinner or two in the hallowed halls of Gothic Coimbra.13 Jardim's portrayal in Jorge Jardim - Agente Secreto14 caps Antunes' work in biographies, leaving him free to tackle his most ambitious project yet - a two volume work weighing eight pounds and seven ounces, and containing over a thousand pages. The text was to be set in tightly kerned pitch size nine - or a generic variation thereof. But what about the contents? They were to focus on Portugal's fourteen year long wars in Luso-Africa.15
The Structure of Text On Wars
Here again Antunes approached the task with characteristic speed. Because the volumes do not provide a detailed introduction to guide readers through the nature, substance and thematic content of the text, it is worth setting these on record here if only to serve as structural and thematic high-lighters of the volumes' salient features. Using a bevy of journalists and assistants trained in >various disciplines' - we are not told how many were in the team and at what level of competency the researchers had in dealing with oral history projects - Antunes began work in June 1994 tapping well over one hundred and fifty sources for oral testimonies,16 written materials, and illustrations. By July 18, 1995 roughly three hundred and ninety days later, he had finished. In that month Antunes penned a two page preface for the volumes in which well over seventy five oral testimonies from respondents appeared. Put differently, had he undertaken the task himself unaided and had he set to meet the thirteen month deadline, he would have had to work at a truly break neck speed - a maximum of three days to collect primary materials, interview and/or seek oral testimony and thence transcribe such materials and produce whence a finished text of seven printed pages on average per respondent - and I am not so sure that he or anyone with similar voracity for scholarly production would have made it on time to the finishing line.
The result of using researchers and journalistic stringers to produce this work is at face value, statistically impressive, if not mind-numbing. The volumes are top and tailed. A year-by-year and month-by-month chronological account of the wars laid out in seventy-seven pages is given at the beginning. A fourteen page index is given out at the end of the book after which there appears a two page list of acronyms used in the text. The volumes do not come equipped with a bibliography. We do not therefore know of either: works consulted on the Luso-African wars (and there are quite a few extant today, written in several languages); or published, unpublished and net-based collections and works consulted on oral history methodology.
However, a quarter of the two volumes do contain illustrations - nearly nine hundred photographs, maps, pictures of dust jackets of books that proved instrumental in questioning Caetano's African War strategies. The volumes do not provide an indexed list of illustrations with captions. Over five hundred of these are sandwiched between five hundred and fifty five pages of the first volume, making an average of nearly an illustration a page. The remainder are in volume two of five hundred and fifty five pages. In short, the illustrations represent a quarter of the volume's total of contents; as such they justly deserve a word or two here.
The illustrations are on the formalistic side, and formulaic in character with a focus on projecting Portugal's Africa as an act of constructive and ever present reality in imperial politics, economy, and development under war conditions. The majority of the illustrations follow therefore a set pattern of iconic projections. Among many of these are to be found the following: Portuguese army in engaged in constructive and creative works; infrastructure development in Portugal's Africa not exclusively limited to shipping, bridge building and repairs, and transportation; depictions of the military involvement in health and sanitation issues; the military in patriotic defense of territories; special units in training, attacks, ambushes, and air-borne activities; women active in logistic support systems; large scale dams and project developments as manifestations of Salazar's Euro-Africa policy; mug-shots of military top brass and politicians (some holding lit cigarettes) in formal regalia or in studious conference with leaders and high ranking officials within Portugal; foreign dignitaries visiting the Portuguese empire; headlines propping up Portugal's global stand as an imperial power; and evidence of atrocities perpetrated by nationalists and their rivals in conflict over legitimacy and political hegemony of an area.
Returning to the text, seventy five percent of these are oral testimonies, as stated earlier. The remainder are texts culled from several sources: private letters, extracts from personal memoirs, military directives and reports from privately held archives, recollections set on record written before the project, confidential military directives and six pieces from the personal archives of Marcelo Caetano.
The range of respondents is breathtakingly diverse. They are worthy of heuristic record here if only to provide future researchers with an indication on the number and thematic emphasis of testimonials for each of Portugal's three theaters of war in Africa - something that the volumes fail to provide . The range includes testimonies from forty eight military personnel (seventeen generals, fourteen lieutenant colonels and/or colonels, and the rest, a field marshal, admirals, field commanders, brigadiers, commandoes, soldiers, fusileers, naval commanders, majors, counter-intelligence special force commanders); six industrialists, bankers, oil magnets; twelve pro-government politicians; five Luso-African nationalists; six foreign dignitaries involved in aiding Portugal's exploratory negotiations with countries neighboring Mozambique; four communist dissidents resident in Portugal; two communist exiles active against Salazar and Caetano from their respective stations in France; a feminist active in the pro-government National Women's Movement; seven ecclesiastics, namely priests, catholic bishops, missionaries based in Mozambique and Angola, and the Anglican bishop of Libombo; one Coimbra-educated liberal advocate based in Mozambique; and a nurse, a journalist and a red-cross volunteer.
The largest number of respondents were military - an easy enough surmise to make. Of these thirty-seven had served in Angola, twenty-two in Guinea, and nineteen in Mozambique. Many had served on more than one theater of war and thus could provide recollections of their respective experiences on both fronts. This was particularly true of generals. Of the seventeen included here eleven had served in Angola, eight in Guinea and only seven in Mozambique.
The testimonials from people with a wide range of professional formation and exposure to wars such as this reflected in part, Antunes' own deeply felt need to craft the work as an oral history project. But it was also motivated in part by his awareness of how complex Portugal's Africa Wars wereas and how far reaching their impact was on several aspects of Portuguese national life and colonial policies: its economy and merchant banking concerns; counter-insurgency against nationalist sanctuaries at the borders; dissident opinion among , priests, soldiers, communists and liberals in the navy and the air force; military and global financial paralysis against initiatives to presage Luso-African nationalist military, and diplomatic attacks on Portugal; internecine fights between and among several ministries and generals vying for supremacy in national politics.
With the result that the testimonies themselves cover a wide range of topics, as breathtakingly wide as the diversity and number of respondents included in the volume. Antunes offers something of value even if a >morselet= to anyone vaguely interested in Portugal's African wars. In a sense the volumes have the makings of a would be encyclopedia - a collection of information laden pieces for someone at a future date to build a larger jig saw puzzle. The topics range from discussions on specific military issues such as the reconquest of Nambuangongo and the invasion of Conakry, to comments by Field Marshal Spinola, reflections by missionaries on nationalist politics, church diplomacy and governance, and clashes with Portuguese wartime bureaucracy and the secret police.
Personal sentiments, professional pronouncements, vexing issues related to the role of the military in specific military operations, divergences of views over how Caetano lost the empire, contending opinions over specific national economic policies are all given airing - and more.
Cabral's assassination is mentioned and briefly gone over. Operation Mar Verde is given pride of place as a piece of oral recollection. Kaulza de Arriaga's Gordian Knot operation is discussed both as a success and as a failure. Desertions by L_aro Kavandame and Zeka Qualiate, two high ranking Frelimo officers, are touched upon. The Wiriyamu massacres are granted a paragraph or two. The massacre at Mucumbura is given a place for discourse as an ominous harbinger to what was to come - Wiriyamu. Wiriyamu's London genesis itself is glossed over but given an inadvertent mention as Portugal's ambassador of the day extolls his own achievement in reviving the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance that brought Caetano to London in the eye of the Wiriyamu storm. The role of priests in opposing Portuguese fascism in Capela de Ratos incident is given airing. All in all, just over five hundred issues, personalities, items related to the wars in Africa are brought to the fore - some in greater length than others.
Telling It Like It Is.
Of the discussions devoted to military operations, the reconquest of Nambuangongo is perhaps the most substantive issue delved into from the point of view of three oral recounts. They prove the most revealing and augment the Spartan accounts of strategies prior to and after this operation. In some ways this discussion would have been richer in texture and nuance had Antunes provided two texts: one, a larger and more substantive preface than is given here in the form of a short paragraph above the article; and two, a preface that contextualized the evidence in literature extant in the field.17
Of the discussion on the military operations in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, several need highlighting here as a cluster, not as augmenters to the cannon; but as critical issues in field work and oral methodology.
One testimony provides a detailed account of the fight at Guiledge which has been set on record by several writers now18 and to which this account fails to do either: enrich the existent knowledge base with textured layers of new realities; or negate what we know about Guiledge. Further, Guiledge in itself may well have been important for the Portuguese. In the larger scheme of things however it begs the question: how consequential was it? Was it more so than say the massive operations mounted during Schultz's reign on the Mor_ forest?. We know that this operation had that forced a major revamp in the Cabral-led forces. What about the siege at Como just before this attempt to get rid of the nationalists just north east of Bissau, the colonial capital of Guinea? Here was an operation mounted with colossal resources that ultimately failed to achieve its larger strategic aims. It did though dislodge the nationalists as a insurrectionist limpet from the Balanta-populated rice fields south of the Geba estuary - but only for a short period of time. They were back and replanted themselves across the waters in Kitafine and Cacine.?
Several officers involved in counter-insurgency during Field Marshal Spinola's reign are granted oral testimony and yet none of the researchers sent to collect evidence seem to have exploited the oral sources to address key issues festering the history of Portugal's African wars. Of these one is how successful did they think the strategy >For a Better Guinea= was in stopping the nationalists in their revolutionary tracks? Were they aware at the time of this fact? If so, to what extent did this awareness catapult some of Spinola's bolder military and diplomatic moves later? What type and kind of relationship did the military have with the secret police? Was this relationship as fraught with tension as was the case in Mozambique's Tete area? If so, to what extent did the secret police in Bissau and the borders conduct an independent war of its own? If they did, could this piece of evidence and that evincing from the military's planned operation to abduct Neto provide us with a heuristic clue to resolve once and for all the mystery of categorical attribution behind Cabral's assassination either through allusive reasoning or better still, with empirical precision?
These questions would not have mattered that much if Antunes's work had been presented as personal memories cobbled in volumes bereft of a professional hallmark. But that is not the case. Clearly, Antunes has set out to craft the volumes as a serious oeuvre in oral history designed to put into practice what he had absorbed during his five-year scholarly stay in Columbia during the early eighties.19 Given these intentions, the volumes would have been enriched immeasurably with the inclusion of a fistful of things: a serious and methodical exposition of the research design underpinning the project; a record of texts, materials, methods, and questionnaires used for collecting data; transcription techniques, conditions of uniformity (and/or lack thereof) used for tapping respondents; editing techniques used to transcribe oral evidence - if transcriptions were indeed undertaken to transform oral evidence to readable texts; and research parameters within which Antunes' investigators had to operate.
Were these researchers instructed to let the respondents speak uninterrupted? Could they arm themselves with a set of reviews of the literature in the field before heading out in the field? Did they actually interview respondents? Could they seek clarification and informative discourse from respondents in the interest of furthering our knowledge-base on Portugal's wars?
Judging from the text of seventy such oral testimonies the answer is in the negative; namely, the testimonies seem to have been constructed in a vacuum as it were. Further, there seems to be little evidence that the field workers elicited information in response to context-specific probes crafted a priori, that is, before field work. Then perhaps the researchers may well have adopted the >el tesimu_= style of methodology. If so, this fact needed stating at the outset. The result is regretfully a set of texts rendered that much poorer - and a golden opportunity lost to craft perhaps a less ambitious but more focused oral research project.
To wit, operation Gordian Knot was indeed a very controversial operation but it had enormous repercussions on the war - and we are assuming here that Portugal's African wars of this period are to be viewed as a complex reality that includes offensives and countermanding strategies from Luso-African nationalists on the other side of the equation. In this case, Kaulza's knot led to the narrowing of Frelimo's ideological arteries away from Mondlane-inspired tactical pluralism to Machelist singularism - that is to say a Machel-dominated strategy to march towards Mozambique's midriff through a bi-pronged attack via Tete. Thereafter, the Tete front came into its own.
On the Portuguese front though, Gordian Knot had impact on virtually all aspects of Portuguese strategy in the region - and this discussion is not brought out in the text despite the fact that some respondents may well have had a first-hand knowledge of the events in the field. It also seems that Gordian Knot had some very serious repercussions on relations between the units of the armed forces as well as between the armed forces, their strategy for Tete and civilians in charge of defense and protection of financial interests vested in the Cahora Bassa dam.
How were these forces at play in Tete during the early seventies? Where did Jorge Jardim come to fit in two years later? Why did the Mucumbura massacre happen? Was an analysis made of this massacre to trace its roots chronologically backwards? Were the roots to be found in Tete's remote areas north of the river Zambezi? Could these roots be linked to Raimundo Dalepa, the commander who had served under Frelimo during Gordian Knot; a commander who had studied this operation Gordian Knot; and a commander who was now busy preparing to strike at lightening speed to prevent Kaulza de Arriaga from gaining an upper hand here in Tete?
Take another equally important issue linking the Wiriyamu massacre both, to that of Mucumbura and, to several other cases and figures appearing in the books. Disquiet among the priesthood was one such case - and the volumes do deal with one such case that of father Sampaio. His opposite though, the Bishop of Libombo, was equally if not more interesting. His case was perhaps even more important. Libombo's ill-fated defense of the Portuguese public declaration of innocence in the Wiriyamu massacre was truly reminiscent of Pius XXII's stand during World War II: make peace with Hitler to save the faithful in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Libombo's case he knew full well that had he not sided with the Portuguese (he was himself Portuguese after all and close to Caetano, Jorge Jardim and their political cohorts) he would have doomed several of his priests to perish in prison in Louren_ Marques manned by the then infamous secret police - the PIDE/DGS.
Libombo's testimony in these books is truly disappointing. It fails to tackle the central issue of his erroneously crafted defense of Portuguese innocence. The researchers seem to have allowed him to get away with ecclesiastical impunity. For that matter Antunes's researchers seem to have exhibited similar lack of awareness in several other oral testimonies; exhibiting in the process a healthy disregard for both, current practices in oral methodology as well as content-based literature in the field of Luso-African wars. In the case of Portugal's Ambassador to London during the Wiriyamu story, they let him slip through their fingers without tickling him to spill the beans on the embassy's role in the cover-up following the publication of the story in The Times of London.
Conclusion.
The overall result of these omissions is, sad to say, a scholarly lump in one's professional throat; not exactly what Antunes had set out to do. He was after sound history grounded in oral methodology. What we have here instead is a clutch of devastatingly widespread but vital testimonies on Portugal's African wars; vital in that no serious scholar in the field can now possibly ignore these testimonies as a starting point, a point whence to posit oodles of questions and thence depart to the archival salt-mines in search of puzzle pieces with which to plug holes in the jig-saw.
In the meantime the twenty-four year old history of Portugal's recent wars (1956-1975) will continue to be where it is: draping the walls of Lusophonia as a jig-saw with gaping holes aching to be filled with missing pieces. Some puzzle pieces of the jig-saw, clearly identified as important to complete the picture, will be extricable in some years to come. Some are yet to be found, or wait to be crafted out of oral evidence. Yet others will continue to elude archival reach. Pieces either ill-fitting or with corners bent to satisfy a specific normative imperative await revisionist treatment. The rest of the pieces existentially too important will remain where they are - their contents and outlines either too faint to yield categorically assured conclusions in the profession; or out of focus to satisfy scholarly craving for a mystery resolved. They will eventually stand in need of correction, replacement or interpretative re-crafting - that much is known and suspected - or certain. And Antunes' volumes may well prove handy here.
Ah Well, there it is.20 José Freire Antunes in a reductionist nut-shell!
Footnotes:
1 The reference here is to Tufte's pioneering work in the display of visual information. See, Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Cheshire: Graphics Press, 1983); Edward R. Tufte, Envisioning Information (Cheshire: Graphics Press, 1990);and, Edward R. Tufte, Visual Explanations: Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative (Cheshire: Graphics Press, 1997). For a comprehensive review of his works see Ann S. Jennings, Jennings on Tufte_Visual Explanations_ (Michigan: H-PCAACA, 1997).
2 I have in mind here, APolitics and the English Language in George Orwell, A Collection of Essays (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970).
3 Edward Gibbon, O. J. Cocksut, S. Constantine (eds.), Edward Gibbon: Memoirs of My Life and Writings (Keele: Keele University Press, 1998).
4 C. R. Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire (New York: Scholarly Book Services, 1991).
5 For Columbia University's Oral History Research Office see, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/indiv/oral/summer.html
6 José Freire Antunes, A Desgra_ da Rep_lica na Ponta das Baionetas - As For_s Armadas do 28 de Maio (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1978); José Freire Antunes, O Imp_io Com P_ de Barro. Coloniza_o e Descoloniza_o: As Ideologias em Portugal (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1980); José Freire Antunes, O Segredo do 25 de Novembro - O Ver_ Quente e os Planos Desconhecidos do Grupo Militar (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1981); and, José Freire Antunes, A Cadeira de Sid_io ou A Mem_ia do Presidencialismo (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1981).
7José Freire Antunes, Sá Carneiro: um Meteoro dos Anos Setenta (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1982).
8José Freire Antunes, Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano 1968/1974, Vol 1 and 2 (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1985).
9José Freire Antunes, Os Americanos e Portugal: Os Anos de Richard Nixon 1969 - 1974 (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1986).
10José Freire Antunes, Os Americanos e Portugal 1961. Kennedy e Salazar; O Le_ e a Raposa (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1991).
11 José Freire Antunes, Salazar e Caetano: Cartas Secretas 1932-1968 (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1993).
12By far the best account of developmental corporatism is by Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1977).
13 For a seminal work outlining Portuguese-Malawi relations during this period see, David Hedges, AApontamento sobre as rela_es entre Malawi e Mo_mbique, 1961-1987", Cadernos de Hist_ia, 6 (1987): 5-28.
14José Freire Antunes, Jorge Jardim - Agente Secreto (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1996).
15 José Freire Antunes, A Guerra de _rica (1961-1974) Vol 1 and 2 (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1996); henceforth Guerra.
16 The list of sources used and persons contact are given in, Guerra, pp. 6-7, and 555.
17 I have in mind here John Marcum's two volume work and similar texts by scholars elsewhere. G. Bender's bibliography for Angola was recently circulated on José Curto's Angola-Net. Contact, Jose C. Curto <jcurto@YorkU.CA> .For a very short treatment of decolonization in Africa and within it the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique see, David Birmingham, The Decolonization of Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995).
Additional works worthy of a peek are, John Marcum's two volume mentioned above, The Angolan Revolution, Volume I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969) and The Angolan Revolution, Volume II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978). For Mozambique it is difficult to suggest a non-polemic work. Two worthy exceptions are, Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle For Mozambique (Harmonsdsworth: Penguin Books, 1970); and Jo_ Paulo Borges Coelho, O In_io da Luta Armada Em Tete, 1968-1969 (Maputo: Archivo Hist_ico de Mo_mbique, 1989). For Guinea-Bissau you may care to see, M. Dhada, Warriors At Work (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1993), and Patrick Chabal, Cabral as Revolutionary Leader (U.K., Cambridge University, Ph.D. thesis, Aug. 1980). Additional bibliography provided in M. Dhada's endnotes.
18 See P. Chabal and M. Dhada, op. cit.
19Guerra, pg. 555.
20 These were the immortal words uttered by Milos Forman's character playing the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph in the film Amadeus. The Emperor utters this as a terminal signal to end discussion, in this case with his court composers, Capel Meisters, and chancellor who schemed to wrest Mozart away from the clerical clutches of Salzburg's archbishop with a commission to write what ends up as the Marriage of Figaro. Page 11 of 11
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